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COMMENT ON "PUBLIC VERSUS REGULATED PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE," BY WILLIG 
Jean-Jacques Laffont 
D rawing on his original work with Carl Shapiro, Robert Willig has given us one of the rare substantive discussions addressing the comparison between public firms and regulated private firms. This question is par- 
ticularly apt in the case of a severe natural monopoly (by which I mean a 
monopoly whose fixed costs are so high that the option of duplicating them to 
benefit from competition is not available). 
The comparison is not an easy one because any imperfection in government 
management of a public firm reappears as an imperfection in government regu- 
lation of a private firm. Sappington and as well as Shapiro and 
Willig explain that in a complete contracting framework the two institu- 
tions are equivalent. To  quote Shapiro and Willig, "The form of ownership 
matters only if there is some private noncontractible information." Any theoreti- 
cal difference thus depends on incomplete contracting. 
Let me first say that I would have appreciated an empirical evaluation of the 
gains from privatization for regulated firms, especially at a meeting hosted by an 
institution that has widely supported it. Willig offers no personal statement 
favoring one form or another, and rightly so. First, such empirical facts should 
be carefully separated according to the quality of the democratic institutions 
concerned. In the case of old democratic countries such as England or France, 
there is no clear empirical evidence on the superiority of either form of owner- 
ship, especially when we are interested in the quality of such long-run decisions 
as investments. The empirical evidence is either nonexistent or mixed; some 
public firms do badly, others do well. 
I would like to challenge two of the paper's assumptions. The first is that the 
government is better informed about an enterprise's costs if it is a public enter- 
prise than if it is a private firm. This is a crucial and debatable assumption, 
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despite its commonsense flavor, for two reasons. First, the analysis suppresses 
the role of the manager of the public firm-the person who has direct access to 
the firm's information and whose objectives are different from those of the 
official in charge (particularly if the official has a private agenda, as assumed 
here). The manager's objectives may be purely private, but then again they may 
be purely public, as civil servants all over the world like to claim. 
The second reason is that the political structure becomes highly relevant for 
this question. In France during the for example, the Finance Ministry, 
which served as the regulator of newly nationalized firms, claimed that it was 
less informed about the firms when they were in the state than when they 
were privately owned. Formerly these firms were required to provide informa- 
tion to the government to justify continuing subsidies; now, however, the direc- 
tors of the newly private firms could bypass the ministry because of their politi- 
cal connections and could go straight to the president. 
Once the nature of the principal-agent problem in the public firm is recog- 
nized, we can see that the government's information will be different in the two 
contexts. In the public enterprise the government may have better direct access 
to information. If the private regulated firm, however, is quoted on the stock 
market, the information reflected in the market price will be available. (See 
Laffont and 1991 for a discussion of dual control by regulators and 
stockholders.) I would say, therefore, that we need more empirical evidence of 
the hypothesis that the government is better informed when firms are public 
than when they are private. 
The second assumption in the Willig paper is that the official in charge of the 
public enterprise has a private agenda (a nondebatable hypothesis) and that it is 
impossible for the framer-or the constitution-to systematically counteract such 
an agenda. Consider the case the paper describes as discretionary regulation. 
Good democratic institutions place strong limits on the government official's 
ability to pursue his or her own agenda. Clearly, the extent to which the official 
criteria deviate from social welfare will depend on the particular country's politi- 
cal and administrative institutional structure. For this reason, I consider this 
question of privatization more a matter of political science than of economics. 
Willig explains that because of the informational rents that obtain in the case 
of the private firm, its activities (and therefore social welfare objectives) are less 
sensitive to the official's private agenda than are those of a public firm. If 
therefore, a minister has a large private agenda, a private firm may be preferable 
to a public firm. 
I am not sure that I understand why the same results can be expected in the 
case of nondiscretionary governance. I believe that Willig fails to see the power 
of the revelation principle of incentive theory. If the framer was able to contract 
without limit with the government agency and with the chief executive of the 
firm-despite asymmetric information-the optimal contract would favor pub- 
lic ownership because in Willig's model private ownership puts more constraints 
on the regulator. Thus the presence of noncontractible information affects 
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vate and enterprises differently, as Shapiro and Willig rightly note. But, in 
addition, the difference is nontrivial only if the complexity of the contracts (or 
nondiscretionary regulations) is limited. In the by now familiar language of 
economists, the privatization discussion should be in the context of a world of 
incomplete contracting. This is indeed realistic but is delicate from a theoretical 
point of view because the assumptions about the nature of incomplete contracts 
may seem quite ad 
So far we have seen that incomplete contracting and asymmetric information 
in the case of private firms can be better than incomplete without 
asymmetric information in the case of a public firm. As the paper notes, incom- 
plete information may prevent a nonbenevolent official from pursuing a private 
agenda. 
Note that all the analysis has been carried out so far in a static model in which 
commitment problems are apparently ignored. This is surprising, given 
statement that an essential factor in the success of privatization is "the 
ability to . . . commit itself to laissez-faire or to a limited and predefined 
regulatory mechanism." He argues that the framer must be able to commit to 
regulatory institutions that protect private firms from expropriation. But note 
again that once agency relationships are introduced in the public sector, similar 
issues of expropriation appear. It may even be argued that managers of public 
firms may fear expropriation of their specific investments in public firms more 
than managers of private firms because there is a greater congruence of man- 
agers' and stockholders' interests in private firms. 
It is thus necessary to pursue the analysis in a dynamic context with the same 
emphasis on asymmetric information and incomplete contracting shown in 
Shapiro and Willig (1990). Technical difficulties, such as the ratchet effect 
generated by dynamic strategic behavior under incomplete information, will 
affect the outcome. But limited commitment may then produce results similar to 
those described in the case of a nonbenevolent official. Indeed Riordan (1987) 
and Sappington (1987) have developed models in which the regulator wants to 
commit to procedures that rely on imperfect monitoring. The idea is that where 
no commitment has been made, imperfect knowledge about firm's technol- 
ogy constitutes a credible promise not to extract the firm's rent (see the model of 
privatization in Schmidt 1990.) 
As for relevance, we must ascertain the cost to public firms of the lack of 
capital market monitoring and the absence of financial takeovers, the meaning 
of the so-called soft budget constraints of public firms, the various risks of 
expropriation of managers' and stockholders' investments, and the differences in 
lobbying and corruption in the two institutions. Furthermore, we will have to 
recognize that a whole continuum of institutional forms is available beyond the 
extreme cases considered here. Then we will start to have an understanding of 
the various tradeoffs involved. Meanwhile, it is important to dissociate the 
legitimate demands for democratic reform from the much more tricky and 
debatable choice between public or private ownership of monopolies. 
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